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Editorial Note:
Loren Landau is Director of the Forced Migration Studies Programme at the University of the
Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. SAMP wishes to thank the author for making this paper
available for the Policy Briefs Series. The paper raises important policy questions about the local
government response to refugees and migrants in South Africa. The views expressed in the paper are,
however, those of the author and are not necessarily endorsed by SAMP or its funders.
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Migration, Urbanisation, and Sustainable Urban Livelihoods
1.0 Introduction
1.1

Crises present both opportunities and dangers. When facing turmoil in the 1980s, South Africa
embraced an aggressive agenda of social, economic, and political transformation. The results are
imperfect, but few question the underlying wisdom of this approach. Many of the country’s local
and provincial governments now feel they are facing new crises. On one hand, they are
empowered to create inclusive, secure, and prosperous cities. On the other, HIV/AIDS and an
apparent influx of ‘surplus’ people from around the country and the continent presents the
possibility of further economic and political fragmentation (see Tomlinson, et al, 2003; xiii; Landau
and Jacobsen 2004). Although migration and HIV/AIDS are dramatically influencing the country’s
socio-economic and political configurations, pro-active response may minimise their negative
effects. Given the nature of migration and urbanisation in South Africa, a reasoned approach to
human mobility may ultimately promote the welfare of all urban residents, regardless of origins.

1.2

In a context of migration and continued social fragmentation, governing for sustainable
livelihoods means overcoming divisions by promoting a sense of a shared future and common
rules of economic and social engagement (see Evans 2002a; Davis 1998; Logan, Whaley, and
Crowder 1997; Logan and Molotch 1987). Indeed, Stoker (2001) argues that throughout the
world, local government’s are augmenting their conventional responsibilities for service delivery
with ever greater emphasis on building public-private partnerships and encouraging popular
participation (see also, Tomlinson, et al, 2003: xi; Simone 2004:12). Fostering mutually beneficial
interactions among all urbanites—whether within public institutions or on city streets—can
transform cities into what Logan and Molotch (1987) term ‘growth machines’: agglutinations of
private and public initiatives and institutions that promote economic gains and their equitable
distribution. This paper explores how exclusion based on nationality or community of origin
effects, to borrow from the Gauteng’s Growth and Development Strategy (2005: 3), initiatives “to
achieve a shared vision, amongst all sectors of our society, for the achievement of our goal of
improving the quality of life for all citizens.”

1.3

While each city and province has its own priorities, they share a fundamental interest in
overcoming fragmentation in pursuit of equity, wealth, and security. Further examining Gauteng
Province’s Development Strategy provides an entrée into current thinking about urban
governance and development throughout South Africa. In this document, Gauteng places
considerable value on building institutions that facilitate interactions among and service provision
to all city residents. That its first objective is “provision of social and economic infrastructure and
services that will build sustainable communities and contribute to halving poverty” (2005: 16)
reflects the indivisibility of inclusivity and long-term planning. The means outlined to achieve this
object similarly echo an effort to shape a common destiny from cities characterised by
fragmentation and exclusion. These include (op cit: 16-17), inter alia:
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•

Building relationships and partnerships between all sectors of society;

•

Ensuring that the benefits of economic growth extend to all our people;

•

Strengthening co-operative and intergovernmental relations in a manner that reduces
competition and reinforces combined efforts towards our national goal of creating a better
life for all people;

•

Strengthening sub-continental and continental partnerships and relationships towards
meeting the goals and objectives of NEPAD.
Unfortunately, as elsewhere in the world, “the desire to construct policies that will advantage
cities in global markets leads those in power to ignore problems of liveability and sustainability”
(Evans 2002b: 141). Although urban elites and the poor in South Africa’s townships, inner cities,
and informal settlements share an interest in promoting their communities’ welfare, these groups
rarely share strategies for realising such ends. To date, there has been a strong emphasis on
improving South Africa’s ability to compete in the global market place. This is most evident in
documents like Joburg 2030, a strategic plan that all but ignores the citizenry’s heterogeneous
backgrounds, aspirations, and limitations. Elsewhere in the country, cities have also been
swayed by promises of a clean, high-tech economy without adequately considering the
prerequisites for and consequences of such priorities. This has translated into concerted efforts
to promote formal business and trade that, as President Mbeki (2003) and others argue, provide
the poor with no guarantee of improved welfare (see also Castells 1998:162; Sassen 1997;
Douglass 1998). Due to apartheid’s legacy, this means a small number of relatively wealthy
whites, together with a select few from other groups, are improving their economic standing while
historically disadvantaged groups remain equally—if not further—marginalised.

1.5

This paper argues that previously disadvantaged groups (i.e., those disenfranchised and
marginalised during Apartheid) are not the only ones facing exclusion in contemporary South
Africa. Discrimination based on nationality or community of origins also risks fostering significant
forms of social fragmentation. Recognising that marginalising any group undermines cities’ ability
to improve all residents’ safety and welfare, effective leaders must actively combat discrimination
even when legally, politically, or socially mandated. In an era of migration, that means finding
creative and pragmatic ways of preventing migrants—from South Africa and elsewhere—from
actively participating in the communities in which they live.

1.6

Although the need to address issues of both domestic and international migration is evident, local
and provincial authorities have typically reacted to the presence of foreign migrants by implicitly
denying their presence, excluding them from developmental plans, or allowing discrimination
throughout the government bureaucracy and police (Vawda 1999; Landau, et al, 2004).1 There
are, however, few reasons to believe that vociferously denouncing foreigners or denying their

1

It should be noted that the Johannesburg metropolitan government has slowly begun to consider migrants as a
vulnerable group although it is unclear whether efforts to include migrants in local decision-making priorities.
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rights will discourage international migration. Regional inequalities of wealth and threats to
human security, combined with South Africa’s ever more prominent economic profile, auger for
increasing numbers of non-nationals coming to and passing through the country. Similarly, the
death of many rural industries and small-scale farming—together with the breakdown of family
structures due to HIV/AIDS—will see many South Africans moving to cities and peri-urban
settlements. We must accept the observation made by Johannesburg city councillor that “as
much as we might not want them here, we can not simply wish people away” (Personal
Communication, 13 July 2005). International migrants—refugees, asylum seekers, job seekers,
and others—together with newly urbanised South Africans are now part of the country’s urban
population. As these movements continue, discrimination based on nationality or community of
origin threatens to create a new socially, economically, and politically excluded ‘underclass’ (see
Wilson 2002[1987]) with the potential to undermine the welfare of all urban residents.
1.7

Rather than serving as a definitive statement of migration and the challenges it raises for South
Africa’s cities, the points raised here are intended as provocations: to promote dialogue and
critical thinking about South African cities’ social dynamics. Although drawing much of its
evidence from Gauteng Province (and Johannesburg in particular), this paper raises issues
relevant to many cities throughout South Africa. Given its scope, it in no way represents the full
diversity of cities’ experiences or the specific challenges facing individual communities. It does,
however, make an effort to draw on national studies or representative data. Given the lack of
good information on migration, it supplements this with personal accounts, news reports, and
policy documents. Specific examples of discrimination and exploitation are included here for
illustrative purposes, but only when they reflect widespread, if not typically, experiences.

2.0
2.1

Migration and Xenophobia in South Africa
Since 1994, South Africa has entrenched its position as a regional focal point for trade and travel.
In doing so, it has also become a primary node in regional migration flows. Although there are
few reliable statistics, the 1996 and 2001 censuses show the foreign-born population of the
country steadily climbing although the numbers are likely to be far less than many believe. While
there are undoubtedly more refugees and asylum seekers in the country than in years past, they
still number under 150,000. In a country of around 44 million people, that is a tiny number. While
there are many more non-nationals in South Africa who are neither refugees nor asylum seekers,
even these numbers are modest. Accepting estimates at the high end of the spectrum—850 000
– 1 million people, for example—means that less than 2% of the country’s residents are foreign
born. In cities like Toronto, Canada, over 40% of the population is foreign born. In some parts of
Tanzania, almost a quarter of the population are non-nationals. The numbers in South Africa may
be climbing, but we should be wary of accepting claims that there are millions of non-nationals
inundating the country and we must keep these numbers in perspective. Recent claims that there
are 2-3 million Zimbabweans in the country, for example, are simply implausible. Although the
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number of Zimbabweans here has grown since 2000, a figure of 2-3 million represents represent
more than 20% of that country’s population.
Figure One:
Distribution of Non-Nationals in South Africa (2001)

2.2

Although immigration and urbanisation effects all of South Africa, it has noteworthy spatial
characteristics (see Figure One). As the most recent State of the Cities report suggests, many
cities are effectively shrinking while once sleepy semi-rural settlements like Nelspruit and White
River are growing, In Gauteng Province, the primary destination for many international migrants,
cities are growing as a result of both international and domestic migration. Although urbanisation
accounts for most growth, its foreign born population has (according to the 1996 and 2001
census) increased from 4.8% of to the total population to 5.4%, reflecting a jump from 66 205 to
102 326 people. These figures inadequately demonstrate the uneven distribution of foreigners
throughout the province (most are in Johannesburg and in mining areas) and severely
undercount the total numbers of non-nationals who may have reason to hide their origins or may
live in conditions that frustrate enumerators. A recent survey (n=1,100) in central Johannesburg,
suggests that close to a quarter of inner-city residents were born outside South Africa (Leggett
2003). The exact figures are, however, less important than the fact that many South Africans
perceive a foreign invasion. Such perceptions are making immigration a central focus of popular
and political discourse although migration has yet to take on the electoral significant it has
elsewhere in the world (see Whitaker 2005; Landau, et al, 2004; Handmaker and Parsley 2001;
Crush 2000). Were the ruling party’s political dominance threatened, one would expect migration
(particularly immigration and asylum policy) to become a central issue in both local and national
elections.
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As indicated above, foreigners are not the only ones moving to the cities. Leggett’s (2003) study
found that 68% of inner-city Johannesburg residents reported moving to their present household
in the last five years. Although shifts within the city partially explains this, at least 11% of the city’s
South African residents counted in the 2002 census had been in Johannesburg for less than five
years. This translates into an increase of about 300 000 people between 1996 and 2001, a figure
far overshadowing the number of immigrants. While figures for the country’s other primary cities
are less striking, they too have climbed.2 As black South Africans claim space in the cities from
which they were previously excluded, they are confronting non-nationals also seeking safety or
livelihoods in the country’s urban centres.

2.4

Despite the country’s ambitions to overcome past patterns of exclusion based on arbitrary social
categories, discrimination based on nationality contrasts starkly with commitments to tolerance
and social inclusion. West Africans (particularly Nigerians) are the archetypical antagonists, but
South Africans include almost all poor, blacks from elsewhere among the undesirables. A
national 1998 survey conducted by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP), for example,
revealed that 87% of South Africans believed that the country was letting in too many foreigners
(in Segale, 2004: 50). These numbers may have declined somewhat as people grow accustom to
living among foreigners, although a 2003 study in Johannesburg found that 64.8% of South
Africans living in the inner-city thought it would be good if most of the refugees and immigrants
left the country. Many respondents openly supported drastic measures towards this end.3
Reflecting global trends, justifications for such sentiments include perceived connections
between a non-national presence and the country’s most visible social pathologies: crime,
HIV/AIDS, and unemployment (Crush and Williams 2003). In Johannesburg—the country’s crime
capital—among the 85% of South African respondents in a Wits-Tufts survey who thought crime
had increased in recent years, almost three-quarters identified immigrants as a primary reason
(see Footnote 3; also Legget 2003).

2.5

These exclusionary attitudes do not only stem from street-level tensions, but have also been
shaped and legitimised by politicians and bureaucrats. The famously xenophobic (former)
Minister of Home Affairs Mangosuthu Buthelezi (1994-2004) is among the most accomplished on
this front, although he is not alone. In addressing a 1997 meeting about migration in the region,
Buthelezi outlined a series of crises facing the country and then argued that, “South Africa is
faced with another threat, and that is the SADC ideology of free movement of people, free trade
and freedom to choose where you live or work. Free movement of persons spells disaster for our

2

See South African Cities Network, State of the Cities Report, 2003, p 36.
(http://www.sacities.net/2004/may30_nation.stm).
3
The survey was conducted by the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) in collaboration with Tufts University in
Boston and was administered in February and March 2003 in seven central Johannesburg neighbourhoods with
high densities of African immigrants and included 737 respondents, 53% South Africans and 47% non-nationals.
The survey was conducted in Berea, Bertrams, Bezuidenhout Valley, Fordsburg, Mayfair, Rosettenville, and
Yeoville. Fourteen percent of the total sample was from the Democratic Republic of Congo; 12% from Angola; 9%
from Ethiopia; 8% from Somalia; 2% from the Republic of Congo; and 1% from Burundi. For additional details on
the survey and the methods employed, see Jacobsen and Landau (2003).
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country.” Somewhat more subtly, Johannesburg’s Executive Mayor reflected a widely held
sentiment in his ‘State of the City 2004’ speech when reporting that, “While migrancy contributes
to the rich tapestry of the cosmopolitan city, it also places a severe strain on employment levels,
housing, and public services.” Given the lack of sound data, it is impossible to calculate
international migrants’ contribution to these strains, but they are likely to be nominal given the
scope of the problems facing the country’s cities. Nevertheless, many citizens and officials
remain convinced that international migrants are responsible for shortcomings in public service
delivery and sub-optional economic conditions.
3.0

Dividing the Urban Poor

3.1

The discriminatory sentiments outlined above are leading to fragmentation in urban centres
struggling to build common institutions and unity among their heterogeneous populations.
Patterns of social, economic, and political exclusion are evident in a range of areas critical to
sustainable urban livelihoods. Among others, these include: access to identity documents and
social services; access to markets and financial services; and interactions with the police and
other regulatory bodies. The consequences of these—discussed further below—include
immediate economic losses together with threats to security and health. They also hinder the
formation of stable communities by promoting a sense of impermanence and undermining the
legitimacy of public institutions. Rather than ensuring that all city residents participate in planning
processes and have access markets, accommodation, and critical social services, discriminatory
practices are creating an underclass comprised of non-citizens from throughout the continent and
domestic migrants who may be similarly excluded. As Beal, et al note, “For the most part,
refugees and migrants are a silent group, never engaging with the authorities or drawing attention
to themselves for fear of incurring official sanction or social wrath” (2002: 125). The following
paragraphs outline the parameters of this exclusion.

3.2

Documentation can not prevent discrimination or ensure social inclusion, but official identity
papers are valuable in finding work, accessing social services, and preventing arbitrary arrest,
detention, and deportation. Conversely, something as innocuous as petty-trade to walking in the
street becomes illegal in the state’s eyes without the requisite papers. There are two key factors
working against non-nationals acquiring the documents needed to help regularise their stay in
South Africa. The first is the lack of any mechanism through which job seekers can apply for
rights to reside and work in the country. Instead, those coming to the country without an
employment offer or study permit must enter on a tourist of study visa, enter through irregular
border crossings or, as tens of thousands have done, apply for asylum once they have entered
South Africa.5 The August 2005 endorsement of the SADC protocol for ‘The Free Movement of
Goods and People’ may eventually ease entry for those with passports, but will not significantly

4

Full text of the speech, delivered 20 June 1999, is available through the Southern African Migration Project
website at <http://www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/migrationdocuments/speeches/mgb/200697.htm>.
5
Asylum seekers who identify themselves at the country’s land borders are given a temporary visa requiring that
they report to one of the five Refugee Reception Offices (Johannesburg, Cape Town, Pretoria, Durban, and Port
Elizabeth) ensuring that all asylum seekers at least temporarily settle in the country’s primary cities.
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alter the country’s immigration regime as it only effectively applies to a small minority of the
region’s residents (i.e., those with passports).
3.3

The second obstacle to acquiring documentation is the Department of Home Affairs, the
government branch responsible for registering residents and issuing documents to both citizens
and non-nationals. One of the most corrupt departments during the Apartheid period,
administrative incompetence and irregularities flourished between 1994 and 2004. Recent efforts
to counter corruption within the department are laudable (part of the DHA’s ‘Turnaround
Strategy’), but considerable problems remain. While South Africans regularly (and justifiably)
express frustration with the department, its immigrant-related activities go beyond mere
administrative incompetence and often operate outside official mandates and regulations. One of
the most obvious examples is that even would-be asylum seekers—who have rights to be in
South Africa under international and domestic law—must often pay a series of unofficial ‘fees’
simply to file an asylum claim (Segale 2004; Belvedere 2003). Those who refuse to pay may not
get access to the buildings or may suffer beatings and other violent means intended to keep
people in line (both figuratively and literally) (see Landau, et al, 2004). Without legal status in the
country, those subject to such tactics are effectively unable to lodge formal complaints. Not
surprisingly given their general hostility to foreigners, few South Africans object to such
treatment.

3.4

Extortion and exploitation follow asylum seekers into the offices. Here, applicants are often
obliged to pay for ‘translators’ (even when they speak English) or additional fees simply to file
asylum claims, a process that is meant to be without cost. Those unable to cover the costs of the
process either drop their claims—frequently remaining in the country illegally—or find ways to
pay, including sexual favours. Apart from their illegality and the threats they present to human
dignity, these practices generate shadow economies within the DHA in which ‘front-line’ staff
jockey and bid for the most profitable posts, sometimes refusing promotion for decades to avoid
conceding their minor, if remarkably profitable, fiefdoms (Chesang 2005).

3.5

After filing a claim, asylum seekers face further obstacles while their cases are considered. Under
the 1998 Refugees Act, the government is expected to adjudicate a claim within six months. Until
recently, the initial six-month period was coupled with a prohibition on asylum seekers working or
studying.6 Although these prohibitions were typically lifted after this initial interval, the
adjudication process often takes much longer. During a period often extending for months or
years (the Wits-Tufts found almost one third of respondents reported waiting at least eighteen
months for a decision) non-nationals remain in a semi-permanent state of limbo during which
they may remain in the country, but receive almost no official or private assistance in the form of
direct aid or assistance in finding employment and can effectively access few social services.

6

This regulation was recently overturned by a case in the Cape Town High Court (Watchenuka v Minister of Home
Affairs 2003 (1) SA 619 (C)).
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Delays in adjudicating asylum claims have also opened the process to widespread abuse.
Without other means to emigrate, and because asylum seekers can legalise (albeit imperfectly)
their stay in the country for extended periods, many non-nationals exploit the system’s
inefficiencies by applying for asylum.

7

By the time their claims are rejected, migrants will either

be ready to return or will have found other means of staying in the country. Such opportunities
have subsequently lead to increased numbers of applicants, further overloading an already
feeble system in ways that heighten delays, limit protection for ‘legitimate’ asylum seekers, and
expand space for graft and exploitation.8 By raising the cash value of official documents (a scarce
commodity), these delays provide significant disincentives for officials to reform or otherwise
expedite the process.
3.7

Even those able to apply for asylum or lucky enough to be granted refugee status continue to
face difficulties in acquiring suitable identity documents. The physical form of asylum seekers’
documentation itself contributes to irregular and illegal practices. Asylum seekers, for instance,
have been issued with a single piece of paper (the “Section 22” permit), often with hand-written
amendments and conditions. Few employers or government agents, including the police and
many health care workers, recognise this document’s legitimacy. Moreover, after a few months in
a coat or trouser pocket, the document itself can become worn and illegible. It is also easily lost
or destroyed. Even those granted refugee status face difficulties: A recent national study found
that only 11% of those granted asylum have been issued a ‘refugee identity documents’
(Belvedere 2003: 6). Among those in the Wits-Tufts survey who acquired documents, almost one
third (29.2%) reported paying fees as compared to under 10% of South Africans.

3.8

The installation of a new Director General of Home Affairs in 2003, and a new Minister following
the 2004 elections, has accelerated the process of issuing identity documents—most refugees
now receive their documents within a month—but problems persist. New efforts to institute a
‘smart card’ system should improve recognition of non-nationals’ documents, although change
will come slowly. Apart from a small group of activists, few South Africans protest these delays,
leaving tens of thousands of legally recognised refugees without the documents necessary to
access employment, social services, or defend themselves against arbitrary arrest, extortion, and
deportation.

3.9

Ready access to informal and formal markets for exchanging goods and services is critical to
successful urban economies. Conversely, obstacles preventing people from maximising their
economic potential denies all city residents jobs and opportunities for trade. Unfortunately, nonnationals are often systematically excluded from employment and income generating
opportunities through both formal and informal mechanisms. Many without the right to work—but

7

Representatives from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimate that less than 20%
of applicants are ‘genuine’ refugees.
8
The Department of Home Affairs periodically promises to address the backlog of asylum cases, but there remain
close to 100,000 claims that have yet to be processed. The current ‘backlog project’ is intended to address these
concerns, although few cases have yet to be addressed.

8

Southern African Migration Project

Migration, Urbanisation and Sustainable Livelihoods in South Africa

with the skills and a willingness to do so—end up with jobs where they are paid below the
minimum wage or work in inhumane conditions. Even those with employment rights report being
turned away by employers who do not recognise their papers or their professional qualifications.
Without money to have their qualifications recognised by the South African Qualifications
Agency, they have little choice but to seek other ways to generate income. While South Africa
faces an acute nursing shortage, for example, there are certified refugee nurses in South Africa
who can not find work.
3.10 Patterns of exclusion are also evident in private sector industries with poor foreigners typically
unable to access even the most rudimentary banking services. Although current banking
legislation technically prevents anyone except permanent residents and citizens from opening
bank accounts, this policy may be waived on a discretionary level, something often done for
those in South Africa on temporary contracts. Under pressure from lobbying groups, some banks
have now begun extending services to refugees, but are still unwilling to open accounts for most
other African immigrants who are unlikely to have the requisite thirteen-digit identity number,
foreign passport, or a formal employment contract. Elsewhere in the world, banks have
recognised the profits to be made from providing foreigners access to financial services; not only
because they typically save at a higher rate than more secure local populations, but also because
they frequently transfer money to and from other countries. At present, only wire-transfer services
and informal moneychangers are collecting the considerable profits from such transactions.
3.11 A cocktail of inadequate documentation, ignorance, and outright discrimination, ensures that
many of the non-nationals who are legally in South Africa can not access to critical social
services. Section 5(1) of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996, for example, declares that, “a
public school must admit learners and serve their educational requirements without unfairly
discriminating in any way.” Importantly, this provision does not distinguish between citizens and
immigrants. Moreover, Article 27(g) of the Refugees Act (130 of 1998) states that: “Refugees as
well as refugee children are entitled to the same basic health services and basic primary
education which the inhabitants of the republic receive from time to time” (cited in Stone and
Winterstein 2003). Despite these provisions, asylum seekers and refugees face significant
obstacles in accessing the educational services to which they are entitled. Other non-nationals,
especially those without documents, face similar or more acute challenges. The de facto
requirement that migrants pay school fees is the most obvious barrier to education and
contradicts a prohibition on refusing admission to public schools based on parents’ inability to
pay.9 Those without the right or opportunity to work often have difficulty making these payments,
denying their children right to education. Costs for transportation, books, and uniforms further
exclude the often semi-destitute non-nationals who find their way to South Africa’s cities. A 2000
study on the Somali refugee community in Johannesburg, for example, found that 70% of Somali
refugee children of school-going age were not in school (Peberdy and Majodina 2000). Although
few data exist on other groups, there are reasons to believe that this pattern appears in other
9

Department of Education, Admission Policy for Ordinary Public Schools (October 1998).
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national communities. Given that refugees have explicitly protected rights to services, other nonnationals may face challenges that are even more acute.
3.12 A similar pattern of exclusion is reflected in access to health service. Section 27(1) of The
Constitution states that everyone has the right to health care services, including reproductive
health care. This clause is followed by Section 27(2) binding the state to make reasonable
measures towards realising these rights. Under law, refugees are entitled to have access to the
same basic health care as South African citizens, although other migrants are required to pay
additional fees.

10

Section 27(3) of the South African Constitution clearly states, however, that no

one—regardless of nationality, documentation, or residency status—may be refused emergency
medical treatment.
3.13 The inability or unwillingness of many hospital staff members to distinguish between different
classes of migrants (coupled with xenophobia) often means that migrants, including refugees, are
denied access to basic health services or that they are all charged the fees intended for
11

foreigners.

Non-nationals may not only be refused services outright, but foreigners—even those

paying additional fees—report being made to wait longer than South Africans before being seen
and are subject to other forms of discrimination. While waiting, one refugee overheard nurses
talking about “foreigners taking government money and having too many babies,” for example,
and another reports a hospital staff member describing the hospital as “infested” with foreigners.
There are also accounts indicating that non-nationals are often denied full courses of prescribed
medicines (see Nkosi 2004; Pursell 2005).
3.14 Failure to overcome these obstacles often has dire consequences. A recent national study of
refugees and asylum seekers found that 17% of all respondents were denied emergency medical
care, often because of improper documentation or ignorance on the part of the admitting nurses
(Belvedere 2003). If one could calculate this as a percentage of those that actually sought such
care (a figure not included in the survey report), the figure would be much higher. In one
particularly dramatic incident, a pregnant Somali woman was refused service on the grounds that
(a) delivery, unless problematic, did not constitute an emergency and (b), she could not pay the
additional fee levied on foreigners (which, as a refugee, she is not required to pay). She
consequently delivered the child on the pavement outside the hospital, only to have it die a few
weeks later. This is an extreme, but not exceptional example. Given their tenuous status in the
country—often aggravated by a lack of proper identification—and their relative ignorance of their
rights, many foreigners simply accept these violations. Indeed, only 1% of refugees who were
refused health services lodged a complaint and 24% report doing nothing, largely because they
did not know what to do. Only 41% reported trying another facility after being refused service,
although it is not clear if all of these were successful in accessing health care (op cit).
10

Section 27 (g) of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 (see also s 27 (b)).
In terms of s 27(g) of the Refugees Act, refugees have a legal right not to be charged health care rates
applicable to foreigners.
11
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3.15 Throughout the country, police officers are exploiting poor oversight, xenophobic discourses, and
immigrants’ vulnerabilities to supplement their income and address what many incorrectly
assume to be the root cause of crime. Non-South Africans living or working in Johannesburg, for
example, consequently report having been stopped by the police far more frequently than South
Africans (71% versus 47% in the Wit-Tufts University survey) despite having generally lived in the
city for a shorter period. Although legally mandated to respect non-nationals’ rights, police often
refuse to recognise work permits or refugee identity cards. Some respondents even report having
their identity papers confiscated or destroyed in order justify an arrest. Furthermore, there are
numerous assertions that police elicit bribes from apprehended persons (documented and
undocumented) in exchange for freedom (see Palmary, et al. 2003:113).
3.16 We must recognise the strong incentives for targeting foreigners, a relatively easy, and socially
acceptable, means of supplementing officers’ income. Denied access to almost all formal banking
service, poor immigrants must either stash cash in their residences or carry it on their bodies
(Jacobsen and Bailey 2004). Combined with their tenuous legal status, (often) poor
documentation, and tendency to trade on the street (hawking or informal business), some police
officers have come to see foreigners as ‘mobile-ATMs’ (Private Communication: 7 May 2004). In
the words of one Eritrean living in South Africa, “as foreign students we are not required to pay
taxes to the government. But when we walk down these streets, we pay.”
3.17 A study conducted in late 2000 indicates that asylum seekers are reportedly arrested and
detained for failure to carry identity documents; on the basis of a particular physical appearance;
for the inability to speak any of the main national languages; or simply for fitting an
undocumented migrant ‘profile’ (Algotsson 2000). In practice, the burden of proof is on asylum
seekers to establish their legal status in the country. There have been allegations that neither the
police nor the DHA affords arrestees the opportunity to retrieve identification documents or to
make free phone calls to contact friends or family. Asylum seekers, refugees and South African
citizens may, consequently, be detained for days while their right to remain in the country is
confirmed.
3.18 There are additional deviations from the law oriented at regulating or extracting resources from
non-nationals.’ The 2002 Immigration Act, for example, effectively authorises the DHA to conduct
searches, arrests, and deportations outside of constitutional or other legal limitations.

12

Without

muscle of their own, immigration officers rely on the South African Police Services (SAPS) and,
occasionally, the National Defence Forces (SANDF), to make arrests. More importantly, SAPS
has exploited this law to legalise what would otherwise be illegal raids on buildings inhabited by
suspected criminals and, potentially, illegal immigrants. Often conducted at night and away from
oversight, police officers force entry, demand identity documents, and arrest both non-nationals
and South Africans without respect for normal legal provisions.
12

See Section 3 (Powers of Department) in the Immigration Act (2002).
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3.19 Illustrating the practices legitimised by such extra-constitutional legislation, a joint operation
launched by the City of Johannesburg and the Department of Home Affairs in September 2003
deployed helicopters and almost 1 000 private security officers in a thinly disguised effort to rid
the city of unwanted foreigners in the name of crime prevention and urban renewal. After sealing
a Hillbrow apartment block, officials managed to confiscate four illegal firearms—modest by
Johannesburg standards—and arrest 198 illegal immigrants. As unpalatable as these operations
may seem, Yakoob Makda, the Director of Johannesburg’s ‘Region Eight’ (i.e., the inner city)
proudly (and without irony) reported their anti-crime cum anti-immigrant achievements to a public
meeting called to help combat social exclusion.13 This is not the only effort to rid the city of
foreigners. Soon after South Africa’s first democratic election, Alexandra Township north of the
city centre organised a campaign entitled ‘Operation Buyelekhaya’ (Operation Go Back Home) in
an effort to rid the township of all foreigners (Palmary, et al 2003: 112). Nor are these efforts
limited to Johannesburg. In 2002, Du Noon Township outside Cape Town also passed a
resolution expelling all foreigners and prohibiting them from returning.14
4.0
4.1

Implications for Sustainable Urban Livelihoods
The forms of exclusion outlined above are not only disturbing to those concerned human rights
and dignity, but negatively effect South Africa’s development trajectory. Accepting that common,
accountable institutions and fluid interactions among all groups are prerequisites for equitable
and sustained growth, paints any source of social fragmentation as a threat. In this regard,
difficulty accessing housing, markets, financial, and social services together with consistent
targeting from criminals and the police are immediately problematic. The remainder of this paper
outlines a number of the current and potential consequences of marginalising non-nationals and
other migrants.

4.2

Economic exclusion: South Africa has a substantial skills gap that the government hopes to fill by
spending millions of Rands on skills training. However, few employers (including the government)
have attempted to capitalise on the economic potential of those already in their cities or who are
likely to come in the near future including international migrants, many of whom have secondary
or tertiary training and experience. Instead of positively exploiting their presence, criminalising
migrants has driven processes of informalisation and illegality. In efforts to protect the rights and
livelihoods of citizens, immigration policy has de facto promoted the illegal hiring of non-nationals
in ways that continue to undermine the unions and suppress the wages paid to all workers.
Moreover, by encouraging non-nationals (and those who hire them) to work in the informal sector
or shadow economy, the government deprives itself of an important source of revenue and helps
create networks of corruption and illegality that will be difficult to eradicate.

13

This statement was made during a poverty alleviation work Workshop Organised by the Joburg Development
Agency (JDA): “Poverty and Exclusion in the Inner City” Held in Johannesburg, 14 May 2003.
14
Palmary, et al, 2003, p 112. See also V Southwell, ‘Protecting Human Rights: Recent Cases – Du Noon
Expulsion of Foreign Nationals,’ Online report from South African Human Rights Commission.
http://www.sahrc.org.za/protecting_human_rights_vol3no1.htm, 2002 (accessed 1 October 2004).
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Whatever the reasons, migrants’ inability to access secure banking has manifold consequences
that extend beyond those excluded from service. Perhaps most obviously, lacking access to
financial services (particularly credit) discourages migrants from investing in the cities in which
they live (see Leggett 2004; Jacobsen and Bailey 2004; Simone 2004: 10). Such disincentives to
invest will likely contribute to infrastructural decay and, since migrants will be less likely to start
formal businesses, limit the creation of new South African jobs (although in the Wits-Tufts
Johannesburg, international migrants still create jobs faster than South Africans).15 For a country
hoping to expand its transnational connections, alienating foreigners is evidently counterproductive. Keeping migrants and those they hire from moving into in the informal economy also
denies the government a source of direct revenues (from taxes and licensing fees) and means
that much of the business that takes place is, to a greater or lesser degree, illegal, weakening the
law’s (and the state’s) legitimacy and regulatory power. Non-nationals’ inability to access financial
services also means that they become primary targets for petty criminals and police extortion,
providing expanded scope and motivation for corruption and challenging efforts to create urban
economies shaped by law. Anything that limits the possibility for productive engagements—or
encourages dysfunctional interactions—limits the ability of cities to grow and distribute wealth
among their residents.

4.4

Access to social services: Education and health care are central to any population’s economic
and physical health. In the words of the UN Secretary General, Koffi Annan, “education is a
human right with immense power to transform. On its foundation rest the cornerstone of freedom,
democracy, and sustainable human development” (Annan 1999:4). In transforming urban
settings, education serves a dual role. The first is to provide children and youth with the technical
and analytical training they need to compete and contribute to a specialised, skills based
economy. Obstacles to any group acquiring those skills will, consequently, project existing
inequalities into future generations and limit the country’s ability to adapt to new economic
opportunities. Education serves a second, but no less critical role: forging communities from
strangers. Through the sustained interactions within the classroom, diverse groups learn
common sets of rules, how to exercise civil rights, and mutual respect. Exclusion from education,
therefore, will create a subset of the population without the knowledge or skills to interact
productively within the country’s cities. It will also shape a sub-population that feels marginalised
and is far less likely to show respect for South Africa’s principles of universal rights and the rule
of law.

15

In the Wits survey, only 20% of South Africans reported having paid someone to do work for them in the past
year. Despite the various obstacles the face, 34% of the migrants in the sample report that they had. Even more
significantly, 67% of the people hired by the forced migrants were South Africans. It is also worth drawing attention
to a recent study of street vendors in Durban illustrates this by showing that South African traders favour nonnationals’ involvement because it brings new products and new business into the market. See also Hunter and
Skinner (2003).
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While the inability to access to education may have delayed effects, denying migrants access to
health services has both immediate and long-term consequences. In the short term, denying
migrants emergency care puts them at physical risk and endangers the welfare of those who
depend on them. Where the denial of services contravenes published legislation, it also exposes
public institutions to potentially costly legal action. Furthermore, denying basic health services—
particularly access to health education and preventive care—raises the spectre of public health
crises. While medical staff may discriminate between citizens and non-nationals, infectious
agents are far less discerning. As long as migrants and South Africans continue to share urban
space—often living in close proximity—those unable to access treatment become a danger to all
those around them. A work force already weakened by the scourge of HIV/AIDS, is in no position
to accept such an additional threat.

4.6

Crime and Insecurity:

Although many South Africans support the police’s strategy of targeting

foreigners on assumptions that they are behind most of the country’s criminal activity, such
actions are largely ineffective in establishing order or security. For one, there is no evidence
showing foreigners are disproportionately prone to criminal actively. An obsession with them
consequently distracts police from where they are needed (Palmary 2002). Even where
foreigners may be undertaking illegal activities (e.g., hawking, hijacking buildings), there are often
root causes that arrests for by-law infractions will not address. Moreover, their general
ineffectiveness is leading citizens to accept criminal activity as part of their social landscape in
which they must seek alternative means to manage crime. In cases, this means turning to groups
like Mapogo a Mathamaga, a national investigation and ‘goods recovery’ company, or other
vigilante groups, that work largely outside the law, but regularly draw on police information and
16

backup.

As Mbembe writes, “Helped by the prevailing lack of discipline, bridges have been built

between the soldiery [and police] and the worlds of crime and fraud” (Mbembe 2002: 58). These
linkages ‘delegalise’ the criminal justice system, robbing the state of one of its most primitive
functions and placing all of South Africa’s urbanites at risk. The Special Assignment episodes
aired on 6 and 13 September 2005 graphically illustrate these dangers.
4.7

The arrest of people trading on the street—whether South African or foreign—or conducting other
small business also affects the livelihoods of those arrested and their dependents. Cities must
promote entry into trading markets rather than close this avenue to those who have few other
options, a category of people well represent in South Africa’s inner-cities and townships. For
migrants who lack the documentation or capital to find work in the formal sector—despite many
having skills to make contributions in this area—regularly targeting this subset of the population
for by-law infractions only drives trade further underground and increases the likelihood that they
will turn to irregular, illegal, or dangerous economic activities.

16

Interview with Cecil van Schalwyk, Director of Midrand office of Mapogo a Mathamaga, 25 July 2003.
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Community: To reiterate a point made above, overcoming racialised fragmentation and avoiding
new forms of exclusion means bringing together people from all sectors of the urban environment
in ways that promote investments in a shared future. Marginalising significant migrant
communities limits the ability to achieve this objective. Instead, migrants often feel a sense of
permanent dislocation fostered by the violence, abuse, and discrimination they experience in new
residential communities. Rather than striving to integrate or assimilate, foreigners instead cling to
their outsider status. A number of studies have found that foreigners make conscious efforts to
avoid close personal relationships with South Africans and many spend their time in South Africa
planning to move elsewhere (Amisi and Ballard 2005; Mang’ana 2004; Araia 2005). Indeed, only
40% of the non-South Africans in the Wits-Tufts Johannesburg survey predicted being in South
Africa in two years and more than three quarters (76%) felt it important for migrants’ to retain their
distinct during their stay in the country. Similarly, when questioned about where they hoped to
raise their children, just over a quarter (26.8%) identified South Africa, while the rest were almost
evenly divided between the respondent’s country of origin (30.3%) or a third country (32.1%).
Critically, journeys home or onwards often remain practically elusive for reasons of money,
safety, or social status. This leaves almost two-thirds of Johannesburg’s non-national population
effectively marooned in the city, but not wishing to take root or invest in it. Although many do not
wish to become a permanent part of South African society, many undoubtedly would if the option
were available. There is little available evidence on newly urbanised South Africans, although
anecdotal accounts suggest many also see cities as temporary residences or transit points:
spaces to earn money before an eventual return to a rural home or movement elsewhere.

4.9

When viewed from the objective of building inclusive cities, this sense of isolation and transience
is problematic for at least two reasons. First, self-alienation—adopted as a defence against
discrimination—creates division and fragmentation that may serve to justify further discrimination.
Second, a sense of impermanence limits immigrants’ interest in investing in the cities in which
they live. People preparing for onward journeys will not dedicate themselves to acquiring fixed
assets and may maximise immediate profits at the expense of long-term planning. Such
exclusion also limits cities’ ability to capitalise on immigrants’ valuable transnational connections.
While Hunter and Skinner (2003) found that the immigrants’ exotic products boosted overall sales
in at least one Durban marketplace, the tendency to limit such sales represents lost opportunities.
Similarly, studies have found that African tourists spend more in South Africa than their European
and North American counterparts (SAMP, undated). Nelspruit, for one, is prospering as a
shopping centre for wealthy Mozambicans. Discouraging citizens from neighbouring countries
from visiting may, consequently, result in considerable losses to the South African economy.
Although domestic migrants may bring fewer skills and resources, their exclusion may have
similar effects in terms of fostering trade, investment, and a sense of community.

4.10 Accountability and Planning: South Africa recognises that sustainable urban livelihoods can only
be achieved when supported by accountable institutions that promote to a set of overlapping
goals among city residents. Discrimination based on national or community origins, like other
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arbitrary forms of exclusion, undermines this objective in two primary ways. First, for reasons
discussed above, populations that do not feel welcome in South Africa’s urban society are
unlikely to respect the rules and institutions dedicated to governing it. Indeed, they may actively
subvert regulatory agencies they feel are more likely to prey on than promote their interests.
Such efforts become visible in efforts to dodge taxes regulations, or to avoid census takers.
When not given the rights to work or documents needed to secure housing, it may also result in
building hijackings, criminal activity, or other undesirable behaviours. Those who feel excluded
are also unlikely to participate in participatory planning exercises (e.g., the integrated develop
planning process (IDP)). Such self-exclusion makes government policies all the less likely to
address city residents’ priorities and needs and may, in time, harm public institutions’ efficacy and
legitimacy.
4.11 Anti-foreigner sentiments and scapegoating has a second, more insidious effect on realising
accountable and responsive public institutions. In the words of an immigrant living in
Johannesburg, “rumours . . . are continuously spread by everyone that foreigners are responsible
for whatever is wrong. It is like, ‘Thank you, foreigners, that you are here, now we can blame you
for everything’. South Africans do not look at their own – they just ignore their own problems and
pretend that foreigners cause all their problems’ (in Beal, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002: 124).
Although such attitudes are by no means universal, the presence of a convenient scapegoat
prevents South Africans from holding their public institutions responsible for their shortcomings
and failed promises. The willingness to accept that foreigners are responsible for children not
finding places in school or for continued insecurity and unemployment distracts people from the
fundamental structural and institutional issues behind these pressing social concerns. Removing
foreigners from South Africa’s cities will not solve these acute social challenges—and may
heighten them—but as long as such expulsion remains a preferred solution, real progress is
unlikely to be made.
5.0

Conclusions: Towards Sustainable Cities in an Era of Migration

5.1

South Africa’s cities—like cities across Africa—are anomalous frontier lands: at once the heart of
state power and economic production while also unknown and unknowable spaces where
existing social and institutional configurations are being reshaped and complemented by novel
forms of organisation Such constant transformation presents tremendous risks, but also
considerable opportunities. As Montesquieu’s notes, “At the dawning of a new politics, politicians
make institutions. After this, institutions make politicians.” Fortunately, South African politics is
still an emergent politics providing considerable scope for creative policymaking and statecraft.

5.2

To achieve sustainable growth, communities desperately need capable and accountable
institutions. Recognising that people born outside of South Africa will be a permanent feature of
South Africa’s cities means that such actions must at least be partially dedicated to fighting
exclusion based on nationality or origins. Similarly, cities must begin to understand how South
Africans move and live in the country’s urban centres. Documents like Gauteng 2014 recognise
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the challenges all levels of government face in ensuring that migration benefits all South Africans
and migrants. Failing to respond to these challenges may condemn the country’s cities to a future
of ghettos rather than ethnic enclaves (See Jurgens, Gnad, and Bahr 2002); social fragmentation
and economic polarization rather than creative tensions and dynamism; protection rackets and
hijackings rather than investment and an expanding tax base. There is now a choice between
allowing government planners to be caught flat-footed or fostering leaders who can help shape
social dynamics for the benefits of all urban residents.
5.3

To develop this new class of leaders, we must recognise that de facto political decentralization
and devolution (see Beal, et al, 2002) has effectively transferred responsibility for responding to
migration to local and provincial governments, bodies already charged with overseeing and
spearheading the development of their communities. Formally, however, responsibility for the
immigration and asylum regime remains almost exclusively within the bailiwick of the national
government. While citizenship and asylum laws must remain national, there is a heightened need
for sub-national actors to assert their influence on the country’s immigration and asylum regime.
Cities and Provinces need to recognise that they can, and indeed must, actively advocate for an
immigration regime that helps legalise—rather than marginalise—their residents. South Africa
need not open its borders to develop pragmatic, affordable, and effective responses to those who
find their way into the country and into its cities. Countering exclusion based on individuals’
community of origin will not ensure secure and sustainable livelihoods, accountable institutions,
and unified communities. It can, however, make achieving these objectives a possibility.
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